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RELATIVE RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE AND
BENEFICIARY TO LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
JAMES L. TILLEY*

There is possibly no other aspect of insurance law which has
caused so much uncertainty as that of the right to assign a policy
of life insurance and the relative rights acquired by an assignee
and those retained by the beneficiary of the policy. A study of
the many cases on the point would give the impression that there
is a complete lack of consistency upon the subject as viewed by
various courts. Of the attempts which have been made to organize
this chaos, none has been found which is adequate to simplify
the problem and show constancy. For, example, in his Treatise on
Insurance, Vance has stated that the conflict of decisions is more
apparent than real, and he has offered an outline based on the
nature and effect, or intended effect, of the assignment itself.
Within this outline, Vance shows that the courts are quite consistent (with the normal number of dissenters), but the outline
itself is admittedly confined to policies wherein the right of the
insured to make the assignment is not questioned. This narrowing,
of course, so limits the applicability of the outline that the value
of its simplicity and uniformity of opinion is greatly diminished.
This paper will deal with the broader coverage of the problem.
WHEN THE RIGHT TO CHANGE BENEFICIARY IS NOT RESERVED

When the insured has himself made application for the policy,
paid the premiums thereon, and designated the person or persons
to whom the proceeds are to be paid, it might seem at the outset
that the right of the insured to assign the policy would be beyond
dispute. However, the beneficiary so designated is the recipient
of rights arising from a contract between the insured and the
carrier, and the contract rules which apply to third party beneficiaries will obtain.
If the policy contains no reservation to the insured of the
right to change the beneficiary, then the rights of the named
beneficiary are, by the courts of this country, almost unanimously
declared to be "vested rights" in the proceeds from the moment of
the issuance of the policy. Thus, these rights are protected from
infringement even by action of the insured. This creation of indefeasible rights in a donee beneficiary is not recognized in most
foreign nations, where the general rule is that the insured retains
complete control over the policy and may use, surrender, or assign
it as he sees fit. Further, it is not wholly justifiable even in the
United States, for in the leading third party beneficiary case of
Lawrence v. Fox,1 there was some doubt as to whether the prom* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
120 N. Y. 268 (1859).
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isee could have released the promisor. This uncertainty is referred
to by Vance 2 who points out that the third party beneficiary
concept,
By no means necessitates the conclusion that
the designation of a person as beneficiary of a conditional promise to pay money at a future date gives the
person a vested right in the promise. It is wholly a question of the promisee's intent. He may intend to retain
entire control over the benefit of the promise until his
death and that the beneficiary shall take nothing until
that event, or that the beneficiary shall assume a present
right to demand in future performance of the promisor,
reserving to himself, however, the power to extinguish
that right at will, or he may intend to make an irrevocable gift by way of declaration of trust. In the case of insurance contracts, this intent may be clearly expressed,
as where an express trust in favor of the beneficiary is
declared, but it is usually necessary to determine it by
implication from the words of the contract taken in connection with the circumstances under which it was made.
An acceptable historical explanation of this "vested right"
theory which is peculiar to the United States may be found in
various state statutes whereby the beneficiary gradually gained
more security of position. Such statutes were designed to preserve for the insured's widow and children, when designated as
beneficiaries, the proceeds of the insurance policy free from any
claims of the creditors of the insured. With this statutory guide,
the courts were not slow in going further in protecting the beneficiary from the insured himself. This innovation comes from
Bliss in his treatise on insurance wherein he states:
We apprehend the general rule to be that a policy,
and the money to become due under it, belong the moment
it is issued to the person or persons named in it as the
beneficiary or beneficiaries, and that there is no power in
the person the insurance by any act of his, or hers, by deed
or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of
the person named. The person designated in the policy is
the proper person to receipt for and sue for the money.
The legal representatives of the insured have no claim
upon the money and cannot maintain an action therefor,
if it is expressed to be for the benefit of some one else.
The cases relied upon by Bliss in support of this "general
rule" did not sustain it; nevertheless, in 1888, no less authority
language
than the United States Supreme Court adopted
4 the exact
above, citing Bliss as authority for the rule.
2 Vance,

'BLISS,

The Beneficiary in Life Insurance, 31 Yale L.J. 348-9.
INSURANCE 496 (1872).

4Washington Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195 (1888).
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The principle has since been accepted in all the states 5 except Wisconsin, in those cases where no right is reserved in the
policy to change the beneficiary. Whether the rights of the beneficiary in such policies be designated vested or contingent, the
beneficiary may assign and his assignee may receive whatever
rights the beneficiary had.; One might question this result on
the ground that the beneficiary can defeat by assignment the very
protection which the insured sought to establish for such beneficiary.'
The beneficiary being the "owner" of the policy where the
insured has not reserved therein the right to change beneficiaries,
it follows that an assignee of the insured would take nothing as
against the beneficiary or an assignee of the beneficiary.
WHEN THE RIGHT TO CHANGE BENEFICIARY IS RESERVED

Ordinarily, when the insured reserves to himself the right to
change the beneficiary of his life insurance, the exercise of his
right of ownership, whether by change of beneficiary, assignment,
or surrender, would seem to be safe from attack, unless the attack
be as to the validity of the change, assignment, or surrender. This
would seem to be the case, at least, if the right is exercised in
strictest compliance with the terms of the policy. In this manner
it would be possible to destroy the entire interest of the revocable
beneficiary, who has no vested interest, but only an expectancy,
the policy itself being the measure of the beneficiary's rights.8
The Colorado courts, however, have not accepted this view,
for this state apparently recognizes no interest as a "contingency"
unless something more than the latent power of the insured to
change the beneficiary stands between the beneficiary and an absolute right. Rather, the Colorado courts regard the interest as
vested, subject to divestmentf The practical aspects of this difference in terminology are considered below.
The problem arises when insured fails to divest, in proper
form, the rights of such a revocable beneficiary. For example,
many policies provide for assignment procedure, but fail to make
clear whether the revocable beneficiary must join in the assignment, as he would have to if his beneficiary status were irrevocable.
That an assignment is not, per se, a change of beneficiary seems
well settled in several jurisdictions, including Colorado. 10 As the
5The leading Colorado case is Anderson v. Grossbeck, 26 Colo. 3, 55 P. 1086
Sheets v. Sheets, 4 Colo. App. 450, 36 P. 310 (1905).
Collins v. Dawley, 4 Colo. 138 (1878).
Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Calif, 2d 173, 157 P. 2d 841 (1945) ; Shay v. Merchants
Banking Trust Co., 335 Pa. 101, 6 A. 2d 536 (1939); Davis v. Modern Industrial
Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 18 N.E. 2d 639 (1939).
'Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Colo. 178, 138 P. 414; Viles v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 124 Fed. 78 (1942).
"Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Colo. 178, 138 P. 414 (1913); Muller
v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 Colo. 245, 161 P. 148 (1916).
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court pointed out in Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Swett,"
The assignment of a policy and a change of beneficiary are not the same, but different things. As assignment is the transfer by one of his right or interest in
property to another. It rests upon contract, and, generally speaking, the delivery of the thing assigned is necessary to its validity. The power to change the beneficiary
is the power to appoint. The power of appointment
must be exercised in the manner agreed upon in the contract of insurance.
Therefore, when the insured, acts alone in executing an assignment or in making a surrender, under a policy which does
not state whether the current beneficiary must also be a signatory,
the effectiveness of the surrender or of the rights acquired by
the assignee (and, of course, of the beneficiary) are certainly
open to question. Many cases can be cited which hold that such
a surrender is binding upon a beneficiary 12 or that as between
the beneficiary and the assignee, the assignee has the superior
right.' 3 These rulings were justified by saying that the form of
the assignment was substantially the same as a change of beneficiary, and operated as such a change, 14 or by declaring that the
insured is the actual owner of the policy and the mere expectancy
of the beneficiary may be destroyed through the action of the
owner. 15
COLORADO FOLLOWS MINORITY RULE

Though the above may be termed the majority rule, it is
apparently not the law in Colorado, which follows the New Jersey
rule that the assignee can receive only those rights which remain
in the insured, and cannot gain a right superior to that of the
beneficiary. Therefore, a surrender form executed by the insured
alone is no protection to the insurer 16 and a docket of Assignee
17
v. Beneficiary would result in judgment for the defendant.
Perhaps these two rules are not so divergent as may appear.
If the assignee takes, under the Colorado rule, all rights which
"222 F. 200 (CCA Mich. 1915).
"Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 579, 103 P. 2d 963 (1940)
Decker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 94 Utah 166, 76 P. 2d 568 (1938); Morgan v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 94 F. 2d 129 (CCA.Mo. 1938); Neilson v. General
American Life Inc. Co., 89 F. 2d 90 (CCA N.M. 1937).
"Aetna Life Ins. Co., v. Phillips, 60 F. 2d 901 (CCA Okla. 1934); Petty v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. 235 Iowa 455. 15 N.W. 2d 613 (1944); Rawls v. Penn Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 253 F. 725 (CCA Fla. 1918). Count!ess citations to this point are
available, but. the persuasive effect of r.he numbers is somewhat lessened by the
fact that in many of the cases, the policy involved specifically permitted assignment or surrender by the insured alone.
1 Merchant's Bank %.Garrard, 158 Ga. 867, 124 S.E. 715 (1924).
Rawls v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., snpra. note 13.
Hill v. Capital Life Ins. Co., 91 Colo. 300. 14 P. 2d 1006 (1932).
Muller v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., sitpra, nete 10.
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were in the insured, this should include the right to change the
beneficiary. 18 If, indeed, such right is transferred by the insured
to the assignee, then it would appear that by the simple act on
the part of such assignee of entering a change of beneficiary,
naming himself in that capacity, that could be accomplished indirectly which could not be done directly. This point is virtually
conceded in a Colorado case, 19 and would thus narrow the gap
between the majority rule and the New Jersey and Colorado rules.
Is the Colorado rule founded upon an insistence upon such a
formality?
Moreover, the Colorado rule does little to protect the beneficiary (if that is the intent and purpose of the rule) except in
the event that the insured in making the assignment fails to
comply with the technical requirements of filing a proper change
of beneficiary naming the assignee. This brings up the question
of whether such change of beneficiary is required either of the
assignor-insured or of the assignee if the beneficiary under the
policy was designated as the estate of the insured. Clearly, any
assignee, revocable or irrevocable, who joins in the assignment
cannot then be heard to complain of such assignment. When an
insured has assigned his interest under a policy naming his estate
as beneficiary, is there included in that act the consent of the
estate? If the insured cannot consent for and on behalf of his
estate, who can? 20
EXTENT OF ASSIGNMENT

Assuming that an insured has complied with all of the requirements to give the assignee superior rights to the beneficiary,
either by having the beneficiary join in the assignment, or by a
formal change of beneficiary, or through the procedure of declaring his estate as beneficiary (if that does free him to assign better
rights to the assignee), there still remains the question as to the
rights as between the assignee and the beneficiary if the insured
did not intend that the assignee should take all the proceeds. From
the above discussion, it can be seen that an assignment of a life
insurance policy is not free from complications and opportunities
for fraud, for normally the assignor-insured has departed this
life when the issue arises. Here the nature and intended effect
of the assignment begins to be the important factor in determining
rights of the claimants, as opposed to the nature of the policy, or
time and circumstances of the assignment.
It must be conceded, however, that assignment immediately
after issuance to one with no insurable interests raises the ques"In this c(mlnection, .s'e Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., R,(prl, note 10
ld.
For an interesting discussion of this problem, Vrr Rahe v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of America, 103 Colo. 241, 85 P. 2d 725 (1938).
,
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tion of whether the assign is part of a scheme of wager or speculation on human life.
The major divisions of such assignments are generally accepted.2 1 They are: (1) Conditional Assignments to secure creditors; (2) Absolute Assignments; and, (3) Pretended Assignments.
Conditional Assignments to Secure Creditors.
This popular assignment may be made to secure debts due, or
advances to be made. Although such an assignment may appear
absolute on its face, the fact that it was only conditional may
freely be shown.2 2 Such assignments must qualify under the rules
of pledges, which require that:
a. Legal title must remain in the pledgor. Clearly the assignee takes only the rights in the policy held by the insuredassignor, and the assignee's claim is subject to whatever equities
or defenses would have prevailed against the assignor.
b. The pledgee must have a lien on the property for the payment of a debt or the performance of an obligation due him by
the pledgor. The lien of the assignee of a life insurance policy
is held to be a right to reimbursement from the proceeds of a
sum equal to the amount of the debt secured, plus any premiums
paid by him, and interest thereon. Although as between the assignee and the insurer, the assignee is entitled to all of the proceeds, he holds the excess over the amount due him in trust for the
bneficiaries or the personal representatives of the decedent. '
The assignee of such a policy normally need show no insurable
interest aside from the debt itself, and he may collect on the policy
even though the debt itself be uncollectable because of expiration
2 4
of the statute of limitations or due to discharge in bankruptcy.
c. Possession of the pledged property must pass from the
pledgor to the pledgee. Apparently, this does not mean that physical transfer of the policy must occur, for even in the jurisdictions which hold this an essential element of the security assignment, any writing in the hands of the assignee which evidences
that such an assignment
was made will generally constitute sub2
stantial delivery. 5
Absolute Assignment.
An absolute assignment may be made to a volunteer beneficiary. Any time that a beneficiary or assignee is designated
" Vance on lnsitrance, sec. 129 (1951).
22.For cases, see VANCE 764, n.6.
3

Bosma v. Evans, 96 Colo. 504, 44 P. 2d 511 (1935); Allen v. Home Nat.
Bank, 120 Conn. 306, 180 A. 498 (1935) ; Detroit Life Ins. Co. v. Linsenmier, 241
Mich. 608, 217 N.W. 919 (1928).
"Mercer Nat. Bank v. White's Ex'r., 236 Ky. 128, 32 S.W. 2d 734 (1930);
Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 210 N.C. 140, 185 S.E. 648
(1936).
' Muller v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, note 10; N.W. Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Wright, 153 Wisc. 252, 140 N.W. 1078 (1938) ; Weaver v. Weaver, 182
Ill.
287, 55 N.E. 338 (1898).
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who is not one of the natural objects of the insured's bounty, the
ugly head of suspicion appears, and the possibility of a wager
on human life is raised. However, there seems to be no valid
reasoni to deny an insured the right to designate, by appropriate
means as set forth in the insurance contract, any person as beneficiary. The right to so designate certainly exists at the time of
application for the policy, and the mere passage of time would
not seem sufficient to deny or curtail the exercise of that right.
If such a designation appears to be simply a tardy selection of
a beneficiary, it is allowable in all jurisdictions except Texas,
where any beneficiary must be shown to have an insurable interest,
as though he himself were the actor in procuring the policy2 6
An absolute assignment may also be made to purchasers for
value. The same objection as above applies here, but the federal
courts, and some 28 of the state courts, as well as those in the
English and Canadian jurisdictions permit an honest sale by the
27
insured without a showing of insurable interest in the purchaser.
Of the remaining states, six disallow such transfer on the grounds
of public policy, although five of these (Texas again dragging her
feet) permit the designation of a beneficiary without such an
interest, which would seem to accomplish the same general purpose. 28 Moreover, most of these same courts will recognize this
"anti-public policy" assignment to the extent of regarding it as
though it were a collateral assignment, and thus
will permit the
2 9
assignee to collect his legitimate expenditures.
Pretended Assignments.
As a link between these sections, the words of Allen, J., of
the Massachusetts bench of 1884, in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen
(no relation),3° on the subject of whether or not an assignee need
have an insurable interest, are quite apt:
The other objection urged is, that such transaction
may lead to gaming contracts . . . . Most contracts have
an element of gambling in them. There is uncertainty
in the value of any contract to deliver property at a
future day, and great uncertainty in the present value
of an annuity for a particular life, or of a sum payable
in the event of a particular death, and such contracts and
rights are often used for gambling purposes. The quesManhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 139 S.W. 51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911)
Griffin v. McCoach, 123 F. 2d 500 (CCA Tex. 1941).
11See cases collected in 73 A.L.R. 1036.
25See Metcalf v. Montgomery, 229 Ala. 156, 155 So. 582 (1934) where the
Alabama court refused to attempt to justify this distinction.

-Metcalf

v. Montgomery, supra. note 28; Matthews v. Matthews, 163 Kan.

755, 186 P. 2d 233 (1947) ; Irons v. United States Life Ins. Co., 128 Ky. 640, 108

S.W. 904 (1908); Schneider v. Kohler, 201 S.W. 499 (Mo. App. 1947); Werenzinske v. Prudential Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 83, 14 A. 2d 279 (1940);

Ins. Co. v. Cohen, si pra, note 26.
"138 Mass. 24 (1884).

Manhattan Life
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tion is whether the right to a sum of money, payable on
the death of a person under a contract in the form of an
insurance policy, has any special character or quality
which renders it less assignable than the right to a sum
payable at the death of the same person under any other
contract or assurance, or than a remainder in real estate
expectant on such death.
The charitable misnomer of "pretended assignments" refers,
of course to wagering assignments wherein the "assignee" gambles
on a life which he could not insure directly. Just which of the
parties is doing the most gambling is open to question, for a hale
and hearty insured might be regarded bitterly as a "wasting
asset" in the eyes of the assignee who holds a double indemnity
policy, and the possibilty of outmaneuvering the mortality tables
cannot be entirely discounted. Nonetheless, some of history's
notorious sell-outs would wince at their greed in the presence
of one easy-going chap who sold the right to gamble against his
longevity for "a dollar or two and a supply of whisky." 31
Such wagering contracts are regarded with pious tongueclucks in nearly all jurisdictions, but it is sometimes a different
matter when one reaches court. Since the true actor in the affair
is the pretended assignee, it follows the basic rules of contracts
to declare such a transaction void, both as to the assignment and
as to the policy itself. And indeed, in some jurisdictions it is so
held, so long as the action is against the insurer by either the
beneficiary or the assignee,3 2 but when those two meet in the
forum, the insurer having paid one or having paid into court, only
the assignment is held to be invalid and the policy valid, 33 presumably upon the theory that if the insurer does not object to
the fraud, the courts will overlook it also. Since the assignment
is invalid, can the family of the insured reap the monetary harvest? Ah, not so, for the gambler-assignee is entitled to be reimbursed for his expenses.3 4 The theory of this result is explained
after a fashion in Finnie v. Walker : as follows:
The theory . . . . seems to be that the assignment
is said to be good as a designation of an appointee to
receive payment from the insurance company, and as a
security for advancements. The illegality is in the attempt of the assignee to retain entire proceeds.
Thus we have circumscribed the matter and find ourselves going out the door through which we entered, for this is the rationale
of the first type of assignment discussed, i. e., the conditional
assignment to secure creditors, past, present, or future.
"Nat'l. Life Ass'n. v. Hopkins, 97 Va. 167, 33 S.E. 539 (1899).
" See cases cited in VANCE on INSURANCE 769, n. 32.
11Ibid, at n. 33.
" Ibid, at n. 34.
"257 F. 698 (CCA N.Y. 1919).

